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The common theme in the Articles by Barry Baysinger and Jonathan
Macey is that standard economic theories of the effect of incentives on indi-
vidual behavior are inapplicable to corporate crime because organizations
are complex entities.' Both authors conclude that proposed Sentencing
Commission guidelines aimed at increasing vicarious sanctions will be inef-
fectual or counterproductive at stopping corporate crime. The Articles'
importance is in making plain what we need to know for resolving the sen-
tencing debate, rather than in providing a compelling resolution. This is
because the policy implications of the new learning on the theory of the firm
that they have incorporated into the debate cannot be identified with confi-
dence in the absence of a formal model and empirical testing.
Although the authors start from the same vantage point, the economic
theory of the firm, their critique of the ability of top management and enter-
prise sanctions to deter corporate crime differs. Before addressing their anal-
yses, I should note a common problem. Both Baysinger and Macey ignore a
fundamental insight, the theorem of Ronald Coase.' The Coase theorem
suggests that the same efficient outcome will obtain whether liability is
placed on the individual or the firm.' Transaction costs, such as the organi-
zational problems Baysinger and Macey identify, undermine the operation of
the theorem. Its insight is pertinent, however, if courts are not better than
organizations at identifying wrongdoers or communicating incentives to
employees. Neither Baysinger nor Macey demonstrates that the difficulties
of internal communication and information processing in complex organiza-
tions will be eliminated if courts, rather than corporations, assume the role
of aligning employee incentives. Indeed, under their analyses, an employee's
discharge is a more effective sanction than individual liability because it is
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' Baysinger, Organization Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71
B.U.L. REV. 341 (1991); Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of
Organizations, 71 B.U.L. REV. 315 (1991).
2 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
1 See Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and
Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1348-51 (1982).
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more severe.4 Because neither provides a formal model showing that top
management and enterprise sanctions will not deter corporate crime, it
remains problematic whether the corporate crime context vitiates the opera-
tion of the Coase theorem and thus throws the Commission's approach into
doubt, as they contend.
Baysinger locates the organizational problem (and hence the ineffective-
ness of sanctioning top management as a means of deterring corporate
crime) in what he terms "excessively diversified corporations."5 He makes a
series of statements about an input-this particular organizational form-
and an output-corporate crime-without specifying the function that
relates the two. More important, he does not provide any data identifying
the causal relation that has been casually asserted.6
The crucial question is whether Baysinger's hypothesis concerning corpo-
rate criminals should inform sentencing policy. To answer this question, it is
necessary to know whether excessively diversified firms do indeed commit
crimes more frequently than less diversified or, undiversified ones. This
proposition is capable of empirical verification, assuming that excessive
diversification can be accurately defined.7 In particular, an examination of
the organizational structure of firms convicted of corporate crime would
show whether they are excessively diversified, compared to other firms in
their industries that did not engage in criminal activity. In addition, the
1980s saw the deconglomeration of American business. If Baysinger is cor-
rect, corporate crime should have decreased in recent years. I doubt that we
would find such a trend, but again, this is a refutable proposition. The rate
of growth of corporate crime can be computed and correlated with industry
deconglomeration. To put it simply, a precise theoretical specification and
empirical testing should and can be undertaken. Without it, there is nothing
to support basing public policy on a hypothesized linkage between firm-level
diversification and corporate crime.
Baysinger suggests that deterring corporate crime by punishing the corpo-
4 E.g., Baysinger, supra note 1, at 354-55; Macey, supra note 1, at 326-27.
5 Baysinger, supra note 1, at 356-57.
6 Baysinger provides two inapposite examples, id. at 344, 362-63: the Challenger
fiasco occurred in a government agency not subject to the same market constraints as for-
profit firms, and U.S. automakers' inability to compete with Japan also provides little
parallel to crime, for managers are less likely to be able to identify in advance behavior
constituting successful innovation compared to that constituting criminal actions.
I This is a difficult task, and Baysinger does not attempt to offer a definition. Macey
suggests that even if the term can be operationalized, the data will refute the hypothesis;
he cites studies indicating that the overwhelming majority of corporate criminals are
small privately-held firms. Macey, supra note 1, at 323-24. Given the valuable exposure
from prosecuting a major corporation, including being showcased to the major corporate
law firms defending such a client, these data are unlikely to be explained, as Baysinger
implies, by prosecutorial incentives favoring the pursuit of smaller firms. Cf. Captain
Ahab Prosecutors, Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1988, at A6, col. 1 (editorial). At the least, a
model of prosecutor behavior is necessary to resolve this question.
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ration or top management may not be an impossible task but that the cost is
simply too prohibitive to adopt such a policy.8 This seems to me to be the
most plausible of his critiques from organization theory of the efficacy of
specific sanctions, but it is unfortunately not developed. Several questions
need to be explored. For instance, what punishment level-treble damages,
more, or less-would be necessary to create the appropriate incentives?
Should the tradeoff of firms' compliance costs and the reduction in corporate
crime be undertaken by the political process directly rather than by the Sen-
tencing Commission? Are the costs prohibitive only in some cases, depend-
ing on the crime, and therefore should policy be more particularized? In this
regard, a natural implication of Baysinger's thesis is that the Commission's
guidelines are inappropriate only for excessively diversified firms, whose
organizational form presents severe problems for vicarious liability. Is vica-
rious liability also inoperable as an incentive device for firms that are not
excessively diversified and therefore not subject to the organizational difficul-
ties that are thought to result in criminal activity? Baysinger does not
develop this implication of his analysis, despite the data suggesting a higher
incidence of crimes by such firms.
Baysinger assumes that corporate agents will seek to enhance the returns
to the organization through criminal conduct.9 He further assumes that the
firm will reward, rather than punish, criminal activity.'" Yet he does not
demonstrate (theoretically or empirically) why any corporation would offer
to promote or financially favor an individual engaging in criminal conduct.
If a firm had such a policy, it would be a clear case for imposing vicarious
penalties on the firm and top management to terminate the firm's perverse
incentive structure. In fairness to his thesis, I believe that Baysinger would
limit it to situations where top management does not intentionally reward
criminal conduct. He maintains that top management in a diversified firm is
uninformed, removed from the action and unable to alter internal incentives
to prevent such criminal activity. The analysis on this point is, however,
unsatisfactory. When the crime is detected, the employees will be severely
sanctioned, and this will serve as a clear deterrent to others." I am less
convinced than Baysinger that corporate crime is rampant and thus unde-
tected by top management and outsiders, an assumption that seems a neces-
sary condition for the analysis. A rudimentary formal model, clarifying the
assumptions that produce uncontrollable organizational deviance as equilib-
rium behavior, would ease my doubts on the analysis's coherence.
Moreover, the reasoning for why firms encourage middle managers to
8 Baysinger, supra note 1, at 363.
9 Id. at 353-55.
10 Id. at 354 ("[C]riminal behavior [may] lead[i to bonuses and career
advancement.").
1 For example, Salomon Inc. recently fired deviant employees, who had violated
treasury auction rules, as well as the senior-most management, who did not disclose the
misconduct to the government.
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engage in illegal conduct is weak. Baysinger contends that using financial
accounting performance measures for middle managers' compensation leads
to a life of corporate crime.'2 While there is much to criticize in the use of
accounting, rather than stock return, measures for executive compensation
plans, there is no study that shows a connection between compensation poli-
cies and corporate crime. Baysinger provides no evidence, even anecdotal, in
support of the contention. The thesis can, however, be tested. One could
investigate what performance-based compensation plans, if any, were in
effect for firms that engaged in criminal activity, and how they compared to
the compensation plans of competitors that did not engage in criminal activ-
ity. Without such empirical investigation, the assertion has no force.'"
Rather than focus on corporate-level diversification as Baysinger does,
Macey emphasizes the divergent attitudes of managers and shareholders
toward risk. The analyses are related, however. Corporate-level diversifica-
tion is, arguably, a function of the incompatibility in risk preferences of the
participants in the firm. 4 Despite the theoretical connection, the predictions
of which corporations will commit crimes differ. Contrary to Baysinger's
stress on large conglomerates, Macey predicts that small firms will be more
likely to engage in criminal conduct.'" This difference is, in part, a function
of differing views of whose utility, principal (Baysinger) or agent (Macey), is
maximized by corporate crime.
In the economic theory from which Macey's thesis derives, devices that
increase managerial risk-taking benefit shareholders: portfolio diversifica-
tion makes shareholders risk neutral and therefore desirous of firm level
projects whose risk is greater than those that undiversified, and hence risk
averse, manager-agents will voluntarily undertake.'6 Accordingly, it is
inconsistent to argue, as Macey does, that criminal activity represents
increased managerial risk-taking and that it does not benefit shareholders,
unless the increased risk-taking is not related to increasing future cash flows.
The latter caveat is an unlikely interpretation given Macey's concern that
heavy penalties on corporate crime will stifle corporate innovation and crea-
tivity.17 Macey's analysis, consequently, lacks coherence.
12 Baysinger, supra note 1, at 359-60.
11 This is also true of his conclusion that corporate crime is related to management's
focus on short-term financial performance, id. at 360: there is no evidence of such a
connection. Although like diversification at the firm level or in accounting-based
compensation plans, such a focus will not benefit shareholders; it is, at best, wishful
thinking to associate such managerial conduct with criminality.
14 See Amihud & Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate
Mergers, 12 BELL J. ECON. 605 (1981) (arguing that managers maximize their own
utility by reducing firm-specific risk, to the detriment of shareholders' interest, by
engaging in diversifying mergers).
15 Macey, supra note 1, at 323.
1' Id. at 320-21 (discussing the conflict of interest between shareholder/principals and
manager/agents in terms of differing attitudes toward risk).
17 Id. at 319.
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Macey views the threat of bankruptcy as increasing managerial risk-taking
and therefore leading to actions typically inconsistent with shareholder pref-
erences.'" Shareholder interests, however, are consistent with increased risk-
taking prior to insolvency. Because of limited liability, they benefit from the
upper tail of the distribution of returns from risky activities and do not bear
the cost of the lower tail. This is a straightforward result of option pricing
theory.' 9 Moreover, shareholders prefer increased risk-taking by managers
quite apart from the option pricing analysis because it steers the managers'
preferences in the right direction, toward those of the risk-neutral sharehold-
ers. This is a strict result of the principal-agent models on which Macey
bases his general argument.20
It is bondholders, however, who do not want managers to take on more
risk, and it is their wealth that is transferred to shareholders from manage-
ment's increased risk-taking. Consideration of how bondholders have fared
upon default-depending on the seniority of the debt, from only one to two
thirds of par value is recovered on average in recent years2' -emakes appar-
ent that shareholders do worse in bankruptcy proceedings than Macey sug-
gests, although shareholders are rarely wiped out. 2 It is thus unlikely that
the minimal interest shareholders may retain will outweigh the expected
value of increased risk-taking on the eve of bankruptcy. In any event, evi-
dence that corporate criminals tend to be financially distressed firms would
make this prediction more compelling. The evidence that most are small
firms may be supportive, because the shareholder-manager conflict is
reduced in that setting, but this is obviously inconsistent with Macey's argu-
ment concerning the divergence of interest.
To further his critique of increased enterprise sanctions, Macey posits sev-
eral reasons why it is unlikely that shareholders benefit from corporate
crime.' 2 I have questions concerning two of the arguments he offers in sup-
port of this otherwise plausible proposition. First, Macey challenges the
view that shareholders benefit from crime by asserting that crime does not
18 Id. at 326.
'9 S. Ross, R. WESTERFIELD & J. JAFFE, CORPORATE FINANCE 589-90 (2d ed. 1990);
Black & Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637
(1973).
20 See S. Ross, R. WESTERFIELD & J. JAFFE, supra note 19, at 421-24; Macey, supra
note 1, at 320-22.
21 See Altman, Setting the Record Straight on Junk Bonds: A Review of the Research
on Default Rates and Returns, 3 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1990, at 82, 94-95
(stating that recovery rates on defaulted debt 1985-1989, measured by price just after
default, averages 66% for secured debt, 55% for senior debt and 32% for subordinated
debt).
22 Eberhardt, Moore & Roenfeldt, Security Pricing Deviations from the Absolute
Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457 (1990) (stating that absolute
priority rule was violated in 23 of 30 cases and that shareholders receive, on average,
7.6% of total awarded to all claimants where violation occurs).
23 Macey, supra note 1, at 326-29, 334-36.
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produce abnormal returns.24 Crime, however, need not provide abnormally
high returns to benefit shareholders. If securities are rationally priced, their
purchase is a zero net present value transaction, and corporate activity
(criminal or otherwise) must provide shareholders with only a normal rate of
return adjusted for the activity's risk. Thus, maintaining that crime does not
pay out abnormal returns is irrelevant to the question whether shareholders
benefit from crime. Macey should instead maintain that shareholders will
not be indifferent between criminal and legitimate activities that provide
identical risk-adjusted returns. For instance, they may experience disutility
from investing in criminal pursuits. In this case they will not benefit from
corporate crime.25
Second, Macey suggests that criminality will be part of the repertoire of
management's defensive tactics to avoid hostile takeovers.26 A substantial
body of literature shows that such tactics are detrimental to shareholders'
interests.' Defensive tactics are, however, irrelevant to the Sentencing
Commission's guidelines. There is absolutely no evidence that managements
seeking to thwart a takeover bid engage in criminal, conduct. Incumbents
have access to a vast array of legitimate techniques to defend against a take-
over as Macey admits.28 While I am no fan of defensive tactics, I would
want to know whether there is any correlation between engaging in criminal
activity and resisting a takeover before I would brand entrenched manage-
ment as putative criminals. Macey seems to recognize this, for he notes that
crime is unlikely to be a successful defensive strategy,' but then he lapses by
reintroducing it as a possibility in his conclusion.3"
These comments should not obscure, however, my view that Baysinger
and Macey have made a helpful contribution to our understanding of corpo-
rate crime sentencing. Their Articles are an excellent first step toward ratio-
nalizing the debate. A great deal more work remains to be done, however,
before we will be able to identify with confidence the optimal sentencing
policy for corporate crime.
24 Id. at 335.
25 Macey also maintains that there is no benefit because shareholders are not
compensated for the increased risk from corporate crime. Id. at 334. This argument is
inconsistent with his analysis because such risk is firm-specific, which is a risk for which
Macey's diversified shareholders do not require compensation.
26 Id. at 327-28 (arguing that because the most effective way for a firm to avoid a
hostile takeover is to show consistently high earnings, managers may cause their firms to
engage in illegal activities to raise earnings and discourage outside bidders).
27 E.g., Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical
Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. EcON. PERSP., Winter 1988, at 49.
28 Macey, supra note 1, at 327-28.
29 Id. at 328 ("[T]arget firms are not likely to succeed at using illegal means to avoid
takeover since discovery virtually guarantees a transfer of control.").
30 Id. at 330.
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